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 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LABILITY AND PERFORMANCE AT 
INTENTIONAL AND NON-INTENTIONAL VERSIONS OF AN IMPLICIT 
PMIR-TYPE PSI TASK 
 
BY GLENN A. M. HITCHMAN, CHRIS A. ROE AND SIMON J. SHERWOOD1 
 
ABSTRACT: A number of theories of psi such as Stanford’s Psi-mediated 
Instrumental Response (PMIR) model suggest psi can function without a person’s 
awareness, and that their intent to exhibit psi may be counterproductive. However, 
few parapsychological studies have directly compared participants’ performance at 
intentional and non-intentional versions of equivalent tasks. This study sought to 
address this issue whilst exploring the role of lability, suggested by Stanford to be 
predictive of a person’s propensity to respond to extrasensory stimuli. Fifty 
participants took part in both intentional and non-intentional versions of a 10-trial, 
binary, forced choice precognition task. A contingent outcome task system involving 
positive pictures as reward for hit trials and negative pictures as punishment for 
miss trials was administered on a trial-by-trial basis. Participants scored marginally 
fewer hits than the mean chance expectation in both versions of the task, with no 
tangible difference in their performance between tasks. Furthermore, no 
relationship was found between the number of precognitive hits they achieved and 
their scores on a composite psychometric measure of lability, nor its constituent 
elements. However, participants’ expectations that their luck could aid their 
performance, as well as their emotional reactivity, were positively related to their 
tacit psi scores. 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the history of parapsychological research, experimenters have used both intentional and 
non-intentional methods in their attempts to capture psi phenomena. Whilst certain intentional means such 
as the Ganzfeld approach (see Bem & Honorton, 1994) have, on occasion, yielded successful outcomes, 
some theories of psi such as Stanford’s (1974, 1977, 1982, 1990) Psi-mediated Instrumental Response 
(PMIR) model suggest that the wilful intent to produce extra-sensory effects may actually hinder the 
underlying process. A series of recent studies by Luke and colleagues utilised a non-intentional 
precognition protocol which was consistent with Stanford’s conceptualisation of psi as primarily an 
unconscious process that functions in the service of an organism’s needs by activating pre-existing 
behaviours in response to threats or opportunities in the environment (Luke, Delanoy & Sherwood, 2008; 
Luke & Morin, 2009; Luke, Roe & Davison, 2008). The method, which was employed relatively 
consistently throughout the four studies, involved a picture preference task in which participants were 
asked to select a preferred image from a set of four fractal patterns. Participants were unaware that this 
was actually a covert test of precognition as immediately after they indicated their favourite picture, the 
computer would randomly pick one of the four fractal images as a target. Stanford’s notion of psi as a 
goal-oriented process was reflected by a contingent outcome design. At the end of a 10-trial session, 
participants who had scored more hits than the mean chance expectation (MCE = 2.50) were rewarded by 
being able to rate positive images (either erotic pictures aligned to their sexual preference or humorous 
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cartoons), whereas those who had achieved fewer hits than the MCE were punished by having to take part 
in a boring number vigilance task. In each of these studies, participants’ mean hit rates exceeded the MCE, 
and 3 of the 4 four studies yielded independently significant evidence of a non-intentional precognition 
effect. The combined mean hit rate across all four studies was 2.92 (SD = 1.46), significantly greater than 
the MCE of 2.50 (t[197] = 4.04, p =  .000078, two-tailed), with an effect size of ES r = .282. 
In addition to describing the functionality of psi, Stanford’s PMIR model also makes claims regarding 
various situational and individual difference factors which may either facilitate or constrain psi from 
occurring. The studies by Luke and colleagues utilised associated questionnaire methods as rudimentary 
attempts to assess the impact of two such factors – latent inhibition and lability. Latent inhibition can be 
understood as the general tendency of an organism to ignore or filter out information from further 
cognitive processing that it is has learned is irrelevant to its ongoing situational concerns (Lubow, 1989), 
and was assessed indirectly via Goldberg’s (1999) measure of openness to experience. Meanwhile, the 
lability construct (defined more precisely below) is often used as an antonym for or on a continuum with 
stability, and the linear and non-linear subscales of the Creative Cognition Inventory (Holt, 2002) were 
used as a convenient proxy measure. Following the assumption that psi may function via extra-sensory 
information transfer, it was predicted that those with higher levels of latent inhibition would be more 
prone to filtering out extra-sensory data at an early stage and hence show diminished performance at the 
precognition task relative to those with lower levels of latent inhibition (see Holt, Simmonds-Moore & 
Moore, 2007). Similarly, it was predicted that more labile individuals would have a greater propensity to 
respond to subtle extra-sensory biases within their cognitive systems and would therefore perform better at 
the precognition task relative to more stable individuals. 
In the Luke, Roe and Davison (2008) study, a significant positive relationship was observed between 
openness to experience and precognition scores (r = .46, p = .01, two-tailed). However, this correlation 
was not replicated in the subsequent study by Luke and Morin (2009; r = -.08, p = .64, two-tailed). 
Meanwhile, when considering the relationship between tacit psi scores and the lability construct, Luke and 
Morin (2009) failed to find significant correlations between precognitive performance and either of the 
subscales of the Creative Cognition Inventory (linear subscale: r = .25, p = .17; non-linear subscale: r = 
.20, p = .27). Despite the inconclusive results regarding the covariates of tacit precognition, Hitchman, 
Roe and Sherwood (2012) were sufficiently encouraged by the overall success of the Luke and colleagues’ 
protocol to attempt to replicate and extend the paradigm. Whilst the core facets of the method were 
preserved, the design of their study was refined in several ways, including the experimental software 
program being completely rewritten in an updated programming language to overcome fears that previous 
results may have been due to an artefact within the code, and the number of trials being increased from 10 
to 15 in order to enhance the statistical power of the study. They did, however, retain all of the 
questionnaire measures which had been used throughout Luke and colleagues’ four studies. 
Participants in the Hitchman et al. (2012) replication scored more hits on the non-intentional 
precognition task than the mean chance expectation (mean hit rate = 4.02 vs. MCE = 3.75) but this 
difference was not significant, t(49)= 1.14, p = .13, one-tailed. Meanwhile, this study provided some 
indirect support for the assumed role of latent inhibition via a medium sized positive correlation between 
the number of precognitive hits participants achieved and their scores on Goldberg’s (1999) openness to 
experience scale, r = .29, p = .02, one-tailed. However, little evidence was found to indicate that lability 
could influence precognitive performance, as participants’ non-intentional precognition hit rates were 
unrelated to their scores on the linear and non-linear subscales of Holt’s (2002) Creative Cognition 
Inventory, linear subscale: r = .14, p = .16; non-linear subscale: r = .03, p = .41, both one-tailed. However, 
in both cases it was argued that the measures used to assess these constructs were too indirect to draw any 
firm conclusions in relation to their effects. In particular, creativity constitutes a very limited proportion of 
lability, which is a much broader concept reflecting a wider range of facets relating to the readiness for 
change of an organism. It may be that the particular elements of lability that have been assessed as 
covariates of psi performance to date are not the most influential, whereas other components of the 
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 construct that have not yet been considered may play a more pertinent role in the psi process. It was 
therefore considered worthwhile in the present study to explore the relationship between performance at 
precognition tasks and a more comprehensive measure of lability, with particular attention on how it 
relates to the PMIR model. 
Lability is a construct that was first popularised within parapsychology by Braud (e.g. Braud, 1980, 
1981, 2002; Braud & Schlitz, 1983; Braud, Shafer & Mulgrew, 1983). According to Braud (1980, p. 1), 
lability represents “the ease with which a system can change from one state to another, the amount of ‘free 
variability’ in the system”. Lability can thus be characterised as the a priori probability (ready capacity) 
that a system will change its state in a given situation. In this regard, Braud has suggested that the brain-
mind may, at times, be constrained by specific structural patterns. On these occasions, the brain-mind is 
said to be in an inert state in which it is resistant to change. Once such structures have been released, he 
proposes that the brain-mind may be at greater liberty to adapt or reorganise itself in relation to psi-
relevant information or events (Braud, 2002). He therefore proposed that psi phenomena are more likely to 
be manifested when individuals are characterised by a more labile (and hence less inert) state. 
To illustrate this, Braud offers the concrete example of when a specific pattern of neuronal activity is 
required in the facilitation of a particular memory. If the neurons required for that pattern of neuronal 
activity are temporarily engaged in other structures or activities, the specific memory will be provisionally 
inhibited. Once those neuronal patterns become unstructured or deconstrained, the neurons required for 
the previously inhibited memory are made available, allowing for the memory to be triggered. The 
relevance of this particular example to the PMIR model is clear when we consider that one of the 
mechanisms through which Stanford (1990) claimed psi-mediated responses could be accomplished is via 
the triggering of pre-existing response mechanisms, which could include particular memory traces. 
Despite the conceptual promise of lability, finding an appropriate measure of this construct is less 
straightforward. Braud et al. (1983) tended to focus on the notions of cognitive and perceptual lability. 
They measured cognitive lability via an assessment of the fluency of word associations, whereas 
perceptual lability was measured by assessing how frequently participants’ perceptions of the Necker cube 
alternated between the two potential representations. More recently, Roe and Holt (2006; Holt & Roe, 
2006) devised a broader measure of lability that combined various established psychometric measures 
believed to be indicative of an individual’s lability. This composite measure was designed to include a 
variety of emotional, cognitive, physiological, neurological and behavioural elements. Specifically, the 
NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992), was included, particularly as openness to 
experience, a constituent element, is thought to reflect an individual’s willingness to engage with novel 
ideas and values, whereas neuroticism is said to be indicative of emotional instability and a poor ability to 
control impulses, with both factors being particularly pertinent to the notion of lability. 
The composite scale also included a measure of temporal lobe lability (Personal Philosophy Inventory; 
Persinger & Makarec, 1987). According to Persinger, those with greater levels of temporal lobe lability 
tend to be more impulsive, suggestible, emotionally sensitive, imaginative, and have a greater interest in 
philosophical ideas. He also suggests they may be more prone to psi experiences (Persinger, 1989). In 
order to account for lability of mood, two items which are designed to screen for bipolar disorder were 
included (Mood Lability Items; Akiskal, Maser, Zeller, Endicott, Corvell & Keller, 1995). This disorder is 
characterised by grand fluctuations of mood, indicating a highly labile state. Finally, following Braud’s 
(1981) assertion that lability is related to novelty generation, two measures of creativity were also 
included (Creative Cognition Inventory; Holt, 2007; Emotional Creativity Inventory; Averill, 1999).  
These measures have subsequently been adjusted into a refined lability scale (Drennan, Roe & 
Broughton, 2011) consisting of 71 items. This refined measure has an adequate level of internal 
consistency (α = .86) with factor analysis revealing five main elements: Intuitive Cognition (26 items, α = 
.92), Conceptual Cognition (18 items, α = .42), Ego-Orientated Cognition (12 items, α = .78), Emotional 
Interpretation (10 items, α = .71) and Analytical Cognition (5 items, α = .79). Whilst this refined and 
validated measure was not available at the time of conducting the present study, given that this lability 
scale was constructed from the composite elements, the composite scale may be considered a reasonable 
assessment measure, and also enables further analysis amongst its constituent elements. Interestingly, 
these researchers found a medium sized negative correlation between the composite lability scale and 
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spontaneous psychokinetic experiences. This reflects the trend that the majority of research in relation to 
lability to date has focused on its relationship with the experience of psychokinesis, with little research 
having been conducted in relation to extra-sensory perception. This study consequently provided an ideal 
opportunity to evaluate the role of lability in relation to a PMIR-type precognition task. 
In addition to exploring the covariates of psi predicted by Stanford in his PMIR model, this experiment 
also presented an opportunity to test one of the key predictions of the theory by comparing intentional and 
non-intentional versions of the psi task. According to the PMIR model, psi can function without the 
conscious intention or awareness of the individual and any consciously generated thinking or cognitive 
constraints in relation to the need for psi in a life event or experimental situation may significantly 
diminish the scope for psi to be manifested. We could therefore expect both intentional and non-
intentional psi to be possible in principle, although the potential for intentional psi may be restricted by the 
cognitive interference associated with participants’ awareness of the need to fulfil a psi task.  
Few studies in the parapsychological literature have directly compared performance across intentional 
and non-intentional versions of equivalent or similar tasks. Rao and Davis (1978) performed an 
experiment designed to assess experimenter effects across non-intentional and intentional psi tasks with a 
limited sample of 11 female participants. The intentional psi task consisted of a word-based ESP test in 
which participants were asked to explicitly guess a series of English and Telugu (an unfamiliar language 
to the participants) target words which were concealed from their conventional sensory faculties. The non-
intentional psi task required participants to rank 40 items from a mood adjective check list on a 4-point 
scale which were later compared against a list of randomly generated target numbers ranging from 1–4 for 
each adjective. The results of the study indicated a differential language effect in the intentional psi task, 
with participants scoring significantly higher on English words compared with Telugu words, but only for 
one of the experimenters. For the non-intentional psi task, it was found that participants scored 
significantly higher when they gave different mood ranks in the second of two experimental sessions 
compared with those who gave the same ranks. Furthermore, the number of mood items checked 
differently across the two non-intentional psi task sessions was found to correlate significantly with the 
differential between scores across the two languages in the intentional psi task. These findings would 
seem to indicate a relationship between participants’ performance at intentional and non-intentional psi 
tasks, with participants who showed a greater tendency towards the differential language effect in the 
intentional psi task also performing better at the non-intentional psi task. It is interesting to note that the 
results of the non-intentional psi task are also indicative of a lability effect, with participants who changed 
their ranks from one session to the next showing heightened performance, relative to those who were more 
rigid in their responses. Overall, however, a direct comparison of the relative strength of intentional and 
non-intentional psi in this study is limited by the different nature of the two tasks. The present study 
therefore included both intentional and non-intentional psi tasks of the same type in order to test the 
predictions of the PMIR model in relation to the cognitive constraints associated with intentionality in a 
much more direct way.  
Regarding the methodological considerations of the present study, it is noteworthy that in the studies 
involving the Luke and colleagues paradigm described above, participants took part in the contingent 
positive or negative outcome task (a reward system similar to the feedback mechanisms employed in 
studies of intentional psi) only at the end of completing a run of 15 trials. However, meta-analyses of 
forced choice precognition studies indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between the 
degree and immediacy of feedback participants receive and the effect size reported for the corresponding 
study (Honorton & Ferrari, 1989; Steinkamp, Milton, & Morris, 1998). Tart (1977, 2001; Tart, Palmer, & 
Redington, 1979) has also argued for the inclusion of immediate feedback in parapsychological 
experiments. His claim revolves around a learning paradigm, in which some form of feedback on 
performance is almost always provided immediately after a behaviour for reinforcement. The elimination 
or absence of feedback, in turn, is commonly used to extinguish a learned behavioural response to a given 
stimulus.  
On the topic of feedback, the stimuli used in contingent tasks are also worthy of attention. In the Luke 
and colleagues’ paradigm, participants in the negative reward condition had to take part in a boring 
number vigilance task. In their replication attempt, Hitchman et al. (2012) observed that, despite most 
 participants indicating that this task was relatively unpleasant, some participants actually claimed to enjoy 
the task, and it was felt that the emotive intensity of this negative reward could be enhanced. To ease the 
transition to a trial-by-trial feedback type mechanism which would necessitate a larger number of 
incidences of contingent outcomes, it was also important to reduce the length of time required for each 
instance. Consequently, unpleasant, scary or gruesome images were selected from the IAPS set (Lang & 
Greenwald, 1993) for use in negative reward conditions. Moreover, it was speculated by Hitchman et al. 
(2012) that the primary function of psi-mediated instrumental responses may be to avoid negative 
outcomes. It was therefore thought that the use of strongly negative, gruesome or scary images provided 
on a trial-by-trial basis may lead to a stronger aversion to the negative reward conditions, and hence a 
greater tendency for participants to exhibit PMIR during each trial. 
The overall aim of the present study was to refine what has so far been a promising experimental 
protocol whilst exploring the roles of intentionality and lability in precognitive performance. A composite 
psychometric measure of lability was employed which contained items from a range of individual 
difference measures which assess psychological, physiological, behavioural and emotional lability. The 
implementation of trial-by-trial feedback, as well as the addition of an intentional version of the 
precognition task enabled further predictions inspired by the PMIR model to be explored. It was predicted 
that participants would score more hits than would be expected by chance on both versions of the psi task, 
although greater performance was expected during the non-intentional version. Participants’ lability scores 
were also expected to be related to their precognitive performance. Furthermore, consistent with the 
Hitchman et al. (2012) study, hypotheses regarding the relationship between participants’ psi scores and 
their beliefs about psi and their own luck were tested. Finally, give the shift towards using more 
emotionally potent negative reward stimuli, it was predicted that precognition scores would be positively 
related to participants’ scores on Bem’s (2003) emotional reactivity items. 
METHOD 
Design 
A repeated measures, quasi-experimental design was employed in which participants completed both a 
10-trial non-intentional precognition task and a 10-trial intentional precognition task in sequential order. 
In both cases, the dependent variable was the number of direct hits they scored on the task, when the mean 
chance expectation (MCE) was five hits for each participant. A trial-by-trial reward manipulation was 
utilised such that each time participants scored a hit (p = 0.5), they were administered a positive reward of 
seeing a pleasant image whereas each time they scored a miss (p = 0.5), they were given a negative reward 
of seeing a negative image. For correlational purposes, questionnaire measures were used to collect 
individual difference data for the independent variables of Sheep-Goat paranormal belief, a composite 
lability measure and emotional reactivity. 
 
Participants 
Twenty male and thirty female participants were recruited by opportunity sampling from friends, 
colleagues, associates, students from the University of Northampton, interested members of the public and 
members of local hobby groups. Although two participants did not disclose their age, the mean age of the 
remaining participants was 27.21 years (SD = 8.72). Participants were invited to take part in ‘a 
‘psychological investigation of possible psychic ability and how it relates to an individual’s personality 
and beliefs’. No incentives were offered in exchange for participation. 
 
Materials 
The following questionnaires were administered: 
Demographic Questionnaire: a two item questionnaire that asked about participants’ age and gender. 
Sheep-Goat Belief Questionnaire: a five-item questionnaire containing four questions corresponding to 
different aspects of the ‘sheep-goat’ belief in psi variable as specified by Palmer (1972) in addition to a 
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fifth item concerning whether or not participants believed their luck could influence the outcome of the psi 
task. Each item is scored on a True / False basis, yielding a total sheep-goat belief score which can range 
from 0 to 4. 
Openness to Experience scale (OE; Goldberg, 1999); a 20-item questionnaire addressing an 
individual’s openness to new experiences. Participants respond to statements such as “Believe in the 
importance of art” and “Have a rich vocabulary” by indicating the extent to which each statement is an 
accurate description of themselves. Each item is rated on five-point Likert scales from very inaccurate to 
very accurate, yielding a score which can range from 0 to 80. Coefficient alphas for subscales of Openness 
to Experience range from .77 to .86 (Goldberg, 1999), and scores have been found to correlate with scores 
on the equivalent scale of the NEO personality inventory (r = .56; Gow, Whiteman, Pattie, & Deary, 
2005). 
Creative Cognition Inventory (CCI; Holt, 2002): a 29-item questionnaire which addresses the use of 
different cognitive styles in the creative process, considering factors such as heightened internal 
awareness, intuition and playfulness. Questions are categorised according to linear (4 items) and nonlinear 
(25 items) subscales. The linear scale relates to logical analysis, planning and careful selection of ideas 
and has acceptable internal consistency (α = .72). The nonlinear scale relates to paying attention to internal 
states, playful cognition, ideas arising in states along the dream-wake continuum and a sense of ideas 
coming from ‘something other’ and also has acceptable internal consistency (α =.92). Both scales were 
found to have adequate construct, convergent and discriminant validity (Holt, 2007). Respondents indicate 
the extent to which experiences such as “Trusting hunches or instincts” and ”Paying attention to visual 
imagery” are important to them being creative. Items are scored on 5-point Likert scales from ‘not at all 
important’ to ‘extremely important’, yielding a total score which can range from 4 to 20 for the linear 
subscale and 25 to 125 for the nonlinear subscale. 
Complex Partial Epileptic Signs (CPES) cluster of the Personal Philosophy Inventory (PPI; Persinger 
& Makarec, 1987): a 16-item questionnaire containing items which relate to experiences similar or 
analogous to those reported by patients with unusual activity in the temporal lobes, often achieved by 
means of direct electrical stimulation during surgery. Each item is scored on a Yes / No basis, yielding a 
total score which can range from 0 to 16. Patients’ responses to these items have been found to correlate 
significantly with measures of electroencephalographic (EEG) activity localised to the temporal lobes 
(Makarec & Persinger, 1987). The CPES scale was found to have a satisfactory level of internal reliability 
and test-retest correlations of r = .85 to r = .95 after 10 days and r = .60 to r = .70 after 100 days 
(Persinger & Valliant, 1985). 
Emotional Creativity Inventory (ECI; Averill, 1999): a 30-item scale containing items which address 
components of emotional creativity such as preparedness, novelty, effectiveness and authenticity. 
Participants respond to statements such as “My emotional reactions are different and unique” on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), yielding a total score which can range from 30 to 150. 
Only two of the items are reverse scored, but no evidence was found of response bias in test data (Averill, 
1999). The inventory has been found to have a high level of internal reliability (α= 0.90) and test-retest 
reliability (r = 0.91 after 3 months). 
Mood Lability items: Three items derived from a self-report mood affect scale developed by Akiskal, 
Maser, Zeller, Endicott, Corvell and Keller (1995) based on the frequent up and down fluctuations in 
mood observed between episodes of sufferers of mood disorders such as bipolar II disorder (Inter-episode 
mood lability [IML]; Kraepelin, 1921). Participants indicate the extent to which each statement reflects 
patterns in their mood on a 3-point scale from “Not at all” to “Very much so”, yielding a total score which 
can range from 3 to 9. These items have been found to be associated with clinical diagnoses of bipolar II 
disorder and family history of mood disorders (Benazzi, 2004; Benazzi & Akiskal, 2005). 
Emotional Reactivity items (Bem, 2003): Two items which address individuals’ awareness of their 
emotional reactivity to violent, scary or gruesome content in photographs, movies and videos. Participants 
respond on a scale from 1 (not at all intensely aware) to 5 (very intensely aware). Bem advises the use of 
mean scores for correlational analysis, which can range from 1 to 5. 
 
The following materials were developed specifically for this study: 
 PMIR Visual Basic program: A modified version of the software program used in the Hitchman et al. 
(2012) study was modified for this experiment by the first author3. The program’s code incorporated a 
number of procedural changes to enable the present study’s experimental hypotheses to be addressed. As 
before, all questionnaires were integrated into the software and the program was completely automated 
such that participants could give their responses and complete the experimental tasks without the presence, 
aid or intervention of the experimenter. The program was used to present images from the following set: 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang & Greenwald, 1993): a large set of emotive colour 
photographs, the contents of which span numerous semantic categories including awe, excitement, 
contentment, amusement, fear, sadness, disgust, and anger. The images have been rated by independent 
judges for their perceived valence, arousal and dominance. After all erotic images were filtered from the 
set on ethical grounds, the images were sorted into 3 groups: 1) positive images consisting of the most 
positively valenced pictures (mean pleasantness rating > 6), 2) negative images consisting of the most 
negatively valenced pictures (mean pleasantness rating < 4) and 3) neutral images consisting of those 
pictures with a mean pleasantness score around the midpoint of the rating scale (4.5 < mean pleasantness 
rating < 5.5). From each group, images were then paired together into sets such that each pair satisfied the 
following criteria: 1) both images depicted content which, in the authors’ opinion, were drawn from 
similar semantic categories (e.g. a picture of rabbits and a picture of puppies both represent animal 
content), 2) the mean pleasantness and arousal ratings were very closely matched (for all pairs, 
pleasantness ratings were within .5 of a unit and arousal ratings were within 1.5 units) 3) that the sum of 
the standard deviations of pleasantness and arousal ratings did not exceed 3.5 units (implying that the 
majority of individuals have similar emotional responses to the images). Using this method, 20 pairs of 
neutral images were selected to be used as target and decoy images for both non-intentional and 
intentional precognition trials. Similarly, 10 pairs of positive and 10 pairs of negative images were isolated 
for use as positive and negative reward images for the non-intentional precognition trials. Finally, 10 
single positive and 10 single negative images were selected from the remaining unused images for use as 
positive and negative reward images in the intentional precognition trials.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were greeted and briefed in a quiet room, where it was explained to them that the 
experiment involved a test of psychic ability, but the implicit, precognitive nature of the non-intentional 
task was not disclosed. After being given the opportunity to pose any questions, participants were left 
alone in a quiet area to operate the computer program on a laptop computer. The principal investigator 
waited in a nearby room and was available to help if participants needed any further assistance. 
The program displayed a written introduction before collecting the informed consent of the participant 
and presenting them with digitised versions of the questionnaire battery. Subsequent to the participant 
answering all of the questions, the program instructed them to proceed to the experimental tasks. The 
program then gave instructions for what had been described to them in the briefing as a ‘preparatory’ 
image preference indication task. Participants were told they would be shown some pictures in pairs and 
asked to choose their preferred image from each set. As a rationale for this task, participants were 
speciously told that their selections would help the program to choose appropriate targets for a later task. 
Participants then took part in 10 non-intentional precognition trials. During each trial, participants were 
shown one of the neutral pairs of images and selected which one of the two images they most preferred 
(Figure 14). At the beginning of each trial, the position of the cursor was reset to the centre of the screen to 
avoid biasing participants towards selecting either of the images. The trial in which each specific pair of 
images occurred was randomised for each participant, and the place each of the two images from each pair 
appeared on the screen (left or right) was also randomised for each trial. 
 
Figure 1 Example stimuli for the non-intentional precognition task 
                                                          
3 Available on request. 
4For contractual reasons, indicative images are displayed rather than genuine IAPS pictures in all figures. 
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Unbeknown to the participants, this image preference task constituted a forced choice, non-intentional 
precognition task as each time the participant had indicated their preferred image from the pair, the 
computer immediately selected one of the images at random as the target. Directly after each trial, 
participants were administered a positive or negative reward for their performance by means of a 
secondary image preference task. If the participant’s selection had matched the computer’s random 
selection, they entered the positive reward condition and the secondary image preference task consisted of 
participants indicating their preferred image from one of the pairs of positive images (Figure 2). However, 
if the participant’s selection didn’t match the computer’s random selection, they entered the negative 
reward condition and the secondary image preference task consisted of participants indicating their 
preferred image from one of the pairs of negative images (Figure 3). No data were collected regarding 
participants’ selections during the contingent reward tasks. 
 
  
 Figure 2 Example stimuli for the positive reward condition 
 
 
Figure 3 Example stimuli for the negative reward condition 
 
 
As per the Hitchman et al. (2012) study, randomisation of the on-screen image array positions and 
computer target selections was achieved using the random number generation function within VB.NET 
which is seeded by the CPU timer. Goodness of fit-tests were conducted on the experimental data to 
evaluate whether or not adequate randomisation had been achieved. The tests revealed there was no bias in 
the number of times each target was selected by the computer (χ2 = .68, df = 1, p = .41), nor a left/right 
bias in the positioning of stimulus images on screen (χ2 = .06, df = 1, p = .80). 
After participants had received their positive or negative reward for the 10th non-intentional trial, the 
computer displayed a dialogue box which informed them they had completed the task and asked them to 
call back the experimenter. The experimenter informed the participants of the implicit, precognitive nature 
of the task they had just completed and answered any questions to ensure that this had been thoroughly 
understood. Here, it was ensured that participants had been unaware of the true nature of the task they had 
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just completed as a means to validate that they had not intentionally attempted to exhibit precognition 
within trials. Participants were then told that the final part of the experiment involved a very similar task. 
However, now they were aware of how the program functioned, rather than simply selecting their 
favourite of the neutral images, participants were asked to use their will and intent to try to predict (by 
whichever means they wished) which image they thought the computer would select, thus achieving as 
many of the positive contingent rewards as possible. Once they had confirmed their understanding of the 
instructions, participants were provided with a password which was required for them to proceed to the 
final task on the computer. 
After participants entered the password, the computer reiterated the instructions for the final task, 
prompting them to intentionally attempt to select the images which they believed would lead them to the 
positive outcomes. The program once again proceeded through 10 precognitive trials by displaying pairs 
of closely matched neutral images in random order. As it was no longer necessary to maintain any secrecy, 
in the reward conditions, rather than administering participants with a choice between pairs of positive or 
negative images, a single positive or negative reward image was displayed on the screen for a 3 second 
period before automatically proceeding to the next trial.  
Once participants had participated in and been positively or negatively rewarded for all 10 intentional 
precognition trials, the computer informed them that they had completed the experiment and prompted 
them to call back the experimenter. The experimenter then provided a full debrief and typically 
participants discussed their impressions of how well they thought they had performed in each version 
(non-intentional and intentional) of the task. Before leaving, all participants were asked not to discuss the 
nature of the experiment with other potential participants. 
 
Ethics 
The project was designed to adhere to the British Psychological Society’s Code of Ethics and Conduct 
(BPS, 2009) and received ethical approval from the University of Northampton Research Ethics 
Committee. Participants were briefed prior to giving their informed consent as part of the program. All 
data were collected anonymously and participants were made aware of their right to withdraw from the 
experiment at any time without having to provide a reason. Importantly, participants were also forewarned 
in the briefing period that they may see negative, gruesome and scary images during the experiment, and it 
was also mandatory that they ticked a box indicating that this had been explained to them and they were 
happy to continue to take part in the study in order to proceed past the digital consent form. 
RESULTS 
The total number of hits participants scored on the non-intentional and intentional versions of the psi 
task was recorded, along with their scores on the individual difference measures. One participant did not 
provide answers to a number of items of the non-linear subscale of the creative cognition inventory and 
two participants did not provide sufficient data in relation to the emotional creativity inventory. Due to the 
large number of omitted responses for these participants, substitution of scores was not considered feasible 
and consequently those participants’ data have been excluded from analyses where appropriate. 
The primary hypotheses predicted that participants would select more target images during the non-
intentional and intentional versions of the precognition task than would be expected by chance alone. Fifty 
participants each completed 10 non-intentional and 10 intentional precognition trials with an associated 
probability of correctly selecting the target image of .50. Thus, with a total of 500 trials for each version of 
the task, the MCE was 250 hits. For the non-intentional precognition task, the actual number of hits was 
247, with a mean hit rate per participant of 4.94 hits (SD = 1.17). The result a of a one-sample t-test 
indicated that, although participants scored marginally fewer hits than the mean chance expectation (MCE 
= 5.00 hits), their scoring did not deviate significantly from chance, t(49) = -.36, p = .72 (two-tailed, z = -
.58). The effect size was ES r = -0.02 by t-test compared to ES r = .16 observed by Hitchman et al. (2012). 
In the intentional version of the task, participants accumulated a total of 245 hits, marginally lower than 
the MCE of 250. The mean hit rate per participant was 4.90 hits (SD = 1.42). The result of a one-sample t-
 test indicated that, although participants scored slightly fewer hits than the MCE, their scoring did not 
deviate significantly from chance, t(49) = -.50, p = .62, two-tailed, ES r = -0.03. On average, participants 
performed marginally better at the non-intentional version of the task (M = 4.94 hits, SD = 1.17 vs. M = 
4.90 hits, SD = 1.42), but the difference in performance across the two conditions was not statistically 
significant, t(49) = .16, p = .44, one-tailed. Furthermore, there was only a very slight positive correlation 
between intentional and non-intentional precognition scores, r(48) = .07, p = .31, one-tailed. 
The next set of hypotheses concerned relationships between psi task performance and individual 
difference measures related to lability. For transparency in interpreting the correlations between psi task 
scores and individual difference scores reported below, Table 1 presents a correlation matrix of these 
individual difference measures to highlight where there may be shared variance. 
  
TABLE 1: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AND TWO-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE VALUES BETWEEN 
PREDICTORS OF PSI TASK PERFORMANCE(N = 50) 
 Sheep-
Goat 
ECI Mood 
Affect 
OE CCI 
Line
ar 
CCI 
Non-
linear 
PPI 
ECI 
.34* 
(.02) 
      
Mood 
Affect 
.07 
(.64) 
.04 
(.81) 
     
OE 
.15 
(.30) 
.49** 
(.0005) 
-.03 
(.80) 
    
CCI 
Linear 
-.16 
(.28) 
.05 
(.73) 
-.02 
(0.9) 
-.10 
(.47) 
   
CCI 
Non-
linear 
.37** 
(.01) 
.63** 
(.0000
03) 
.06 
(.70) 
.53** 
(.0001) 
.01 
(.95) 
  
PPI 
51** 
(.0001) 
.38** 
(.01) 
.05 
(.71) 
.42** 
(.003) 
-.24 
(.10) 
.50** 
(.0002) 
 
ER 
.09 
(.54) 
.34* 
(.02) 
.04 
(.78) 
.26 
(.07) 
-.09 
(.53) 
.17 
(.23) 
.04 
(.76) 
* Significant at the .05 level 
** Significant at the .01 level 
ECI: Emotional Creativity Inventory; OE: Openness to Experience; CCI: Creative Cognition Inventory; 
PPI: Personal Philosophy Inventory; ER: Emotional Reactivity 
 
It was predicted that participants’ performance on the a) non-intentional and b) intentional versions of 
the precognition task would be positively correlated with their scores on a composite measure of lability. 
Scores on the constituent elements of lability (Emotional Creativity, Mood Affect, Openness to 
Experience, Creative Cognition and Complex Partial Epileptic Signs) were amalgamated into a single 
score. Table 2 shows that composite lability scores were positively related to participants’ performance at 
the non-intentional version of the precognition task, although the relationship was not statistically 
significant, r(45) = .17, p = .13 one-tailed. Conversely, composite lability scores were found to be 
negatively related to participants’ performance at the intentional version of the precognition task, but not 
significantly so, r(45) = -.13, p = .39, two-tailed. A Steiger calculation (Clark-Carter, 2010) revealed that 
the difference between the two correlations was not significant, t(44) = 1.39, p = .09, one-tailed. 
Furthermore, none of the constituent elements of the composite lability scale were found to be 
significantly related to either intentional or non-intentional precognition scores.  
 
TABLE 2: PEARSON CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PSI TASK SCORES AND PREDICTED COVARIATES AND 
STEIGER CALCULATIONS WITH ONE-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS 
 N Non-intentional Intentional Steiger’s t 
Sheep-goat 50 .07 
(.31) 
-.06# 
(.67) 
0.68 
(.25) 
ECI 48 .06 
(.34) 
-.13# 
(.39) 
0.91 
(.18) 
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Mood Affect 50 .03 
(.42) 
-.10# 
(.48) 
0.68 
(.25) 
OE 50 .10 
(.26) 
-.12# 
(.41) 
1.10 
(.14) 
CCI Linear 50 .18 
(.11) 
.22 
(.06) 
0.24 
(.41) 
CCI Non-linear 49 .13 
(.18) 
-.08# 
(.61) 
1.03 
(.15) 
PPI 50 .18 
(.11) 
-.20# 
(.16) 
2.01* 
(.03) 
Composite 
lability 
47 .17 
(.13) 
-.13# 
(.39) 
1.39 
(.09) 
Emotional 
reactivity 
50 .29* 
(.02) 
-.04# 
(.79) 
1.68 
(.05) 
# Two-tailed significance value is reported as the direction of the relationship was contrary to the 
hypothesis 
* significant at the .05 level 
ECI: Emotional Creativity Inventory; OE: Openness to Experience; CCI: Creative Cognition Inventory; 
PPI: Personal Philosophy Inventory 
 
It was also predicted that emotionally reactive participants would perform better at both versions of the 
precognition task. A mean score of the two emotional reactivity questions was calculated and correlated 
against participants’ precognition scores. For non-intentional trials, there was a significant positive 
correlation between participants’ precognitive performance and their mean emotional reactivity scores, 
r(48) = .29, p = .02, one-tailed. For intentional trials, there was a small, negative, non-significant 
correlation between the two variables, r(48) = -.04, p = .79, two-tailed. A Steiger calculation revealed that 
the difference between the two correlations was on the threshold of statistical significance, t(47) = 1.68, p 
= .05, one-tailed. 
Turning to the belief measures, consistent with the Hitchman et al. (2012) study, it was predicted that 
performance on the a) non-intentional and b) intentional versions of the precognition task would be 
positively correlated with participants’ belief in psi (as measured by criteria I-IV of the Sheep-Goat 
questionnaire). Table 2 shows a very small positive correlation between belief in psi and performance on 
the non-intentional version of the precognition task and a very small negative correlation between belief in 
psi and performance on the intentional version of the precognition task. Both correlations were negligible 
and neither reached statistical significance, non-intentional: r(48) = .07, p = .31, one-tailed; intentional: 
r(48) = -.06, p = .67, two-tailed. 
Also consistent with the Hitchman et al. (2012) study, it was hypothesised that participants who 
believed they could use their psi to affect the outcome of the experiment would perform better at the a) 
non-intentional and b) intentional versions of the precognition task. Participants responded true or false to 
the statement “I believe that my psychic ability can affect the outcome of this experiment” and were 
grouped according to their response. The majority of participants (n = 40) indicated they were goats (i.e. 
their psychic ability couldn’t influence the outcome of the experiment) compared with just 10 sheep. 
Sheep performed marginally better at the non-intentional version of the precognition task than goats 
(sheep mean precognition task score = 5.30, SD = 0.82; goat mean precognition task score = 4.85, SD = 
1.23), but the difference was not significant, t(48) = 1.09, p = .14, one-tailed. In the intentional version of 
the task, goats outperformed sheep (sheep mean precognition task score = 4.60, SD = 1.35; goat mean 
precognition task score = 4.98, SD = 1.44) but the difference was also nonsignificant, t(48) = -.75, p = .46, 
two-tailed. 
A similar hypothesis predicted that participants who believed that their luck could influence the 
outcome of the test would achieve a higher score on the a) non-intentional and b) intentional versions of 
the precognition task. For non-intentional trials, the 30 ‘Luck sheep’ (60%) who indicated that they 
believed their luck could affect the outcome of the experiment scored nonsignificantly higher on the psi 
task than the 20 ‘Luck goats’ (40%) who indicated to the contrary (luck sheep mean psi score = 5.13, SD = 
 1.31; luck goat mean psi score = 4.65, SD = .88, t[48] = 1.45, p = .08, one-tailed). For intentional trials, 
luck sheep also outperformed luck goats (luck sheep mean psi score = 5.20, SD = 1.32; luck goat mean psi 
score = 4.45, SD = 1.47). The result of an independent samples t-test indicated that ‘Luck sheep’ 
performed significantly better than the ‘Luck goats’, t(48) = 1.88, p = .03, one-tailed. 
As noted by Hitchman et al. (2012), the parametric Pearson correlation test may not be valid for scales 
with a score range of less than 20 points (Clark-Carter, 2010). This applies to the Sheep-Goat, Mood 
Affect, Personal Philosophy Inventory and Emotional Reactivity measures. Whilst Pearson correlations 
are reported above for consistency and comparison with other correlations, Spearman non-parametric 
correlations were also calculated. The results indicated the same pattern: Sheep-Goat: non-intentional rs = 
.03; p = .42, one-tailed, intentional rs = -.07, p = .60, two-tailed; Mood Affect: non-intentional rs = .03; p = 
.42, one-tailed, intentional rs = -.08, p = .58, two-tailed; Personal Philosophy Inventory: non-intentional rs 
= .16; p = .14, one-tailed, intentional rs = -.22, p = .12, two-tailed; Emotional Reactivity: non-intentional rs 
= .36; p = .005, one-tailed, intentional rs = -.10, p = .48, two-tailed. 
 
Post-hoc analysis of participants’ image preference biases 
The present study made use of closely matched pairs of authentic images as targets in the precognition 
task as opposed to the sets of four fractal images used in previous studies. It was therefore important to 
assess whether participants exhibited any systematic biases towards either image from each pair. Table 3 
presents the number of times each image from each set was selected. The results of chi-square analyses 
indicated that participants appeared to exhibit a systematic preference for image A in set 8, χ2 (1, N = 50) 
= 3.92, p = .05 and image B in set 11 χ2 (1, N = 50) = 5.12, p = .02. Hitchman et al. (2012) reported that 
participants showed similar biases within 2 out of the 15 sets of fractal target images in their study. 
Consequently, it would appear that the use of authentic images in place of fractal target images did not 
bring about a tangible increase in the extent of participants’ preferences for specific images within each 
set. 
 
TABLE 3: CHI SQUARE ANALYSES OF PARTICIPANTS’ PREFERENCES FOR A SPECIFIC IMAGE FROM EACH 
TARGET PAIR 
Image 
set 
Image A 
selected 
Image B 
selected 
χ2 p 
1 31 19 2.88 .09 
2 20 30 2.00 .16 
3 29 21 1.28 .26 
4 19 31 2.88 .09 
5 22 28 0.72 .40 
6 24 26 0.08 .78 
7 26 24 0.08 .78 
8 32 18 3.92 .05* 
9 30 20 2.00 .16 
10 24 26 0.08 .78 
11 17 33 5.12 .02* 
12 31 19 2.88 .09 
13 25 25 0.00 1.00 
14 29 21 1.28 .26 
15 30 20 2.00 .16 
16 19 31 2.88 .09 
17 21 29 1.28 .26 
18 30 20 2.00 .16 
19 31 19 2.88 .09 
20 26 24 0.08 .78 
* significant at the .05 level 
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Post-hoc analysis of practice/decline effects 
Given that by necessity in this repeated measures design, participants always took part in the non-
intentional precognition task before completing the intentional precognition task, concerns were raised 
over the potential influence of practice and/or decline effects. In order to assess this, the total number of 
hits achieved by all participants for each trial was considered. Figure 4 indicates that there were no clear 
patterns in performance across either non-intentional trials (T1-T10) or intentional trials (T11-T20). In 
support of this, chi-square analysis indicated there were no significant differences between overall 
performance in each trial, χ2 (19, N = 50) = 8.65, p = .98. Therefore, no evidence of either practice or 
decline effects was observed across the experiment. 
 
Figure 4: Total hits achieved by all participants for each trial 
 
Consistent with the Hitchman et al. (2012) study, multiple statistical tests have been conducted without 
a correction applied to the alpha levels for multiple analyses. Milton and Wiseman (1997) have noted that 
the standard Bonferroni adjustment should be considered conservative, whilst Abdi (2007) claims the 
Bonferroni correction is not appropriate when the inferential tests conducted are not entirely independent. 
Readers are advised to treat any results reported as statistically significant with caution, as the chance of a 
type 1 error is increased as a consequence of the multiple analyses carried out. 
DISCUSSION 
The main experimental hypotheses of this study concerned a comparison of performance at equivalent 
non-intentional and intentional precognition tasks and the relationship between precognition and lability 
scores. Within Stanford’s specification of the PMIR model, it is claimed that knowledge of need-relevant 
circumstances and an intention to fulfil such needs may play an inhibitory role in the psi-mediated 
instrumental response process. It was therefore expected that performance on the non-intentional 
precognition task would be higher than on the intentional precognition task. Overall, participants selected 
slightly fewer of the target images than the MCE in both non-intentional and intentional versions of the 
precognition task, providing no evidence of either intentional or non-intentional psi. Furthermore, 
although participants performed slightly better in the non-intentional version of the task as hypothesised, 
 there was not a statistically significant difference between scores, t(49) = .16, p = .44, one-tailed. 
Meanwhile, participants’ lability scores were found to be unrelated to both their intentional and non-
intentional precognitive performance. 
Although the results of the Hitchman et al. (2012) study in relation to the main psi effect were in the 
predicted direction, they were nevertheless nonsignificant. The findings of the present study therefore 
represent a further decline in tacit precognition scores to below-chance levels and a second failure to 
replicate the significant effects demonstrated by Luke and associates using a largely similar method. 
Colborn (2004) has reviewed a multitude of factors which may account for general patterns of declining 
results across parapsychological paradigms. Amongst these, there are several potential explanations which 
may account for these dissimilarities in results obtained by different researchers, including false positives 
(type 1 errors), decline effects, design modifications and experimenter effects. In the case of the former, it 
may simply be a chance occurrence that Luke and associates were able to achieve psi indicative results 
which are nevertheless spurious and not reflective of a genuine and robust effect. However, this 
interpretation is questionable given that the results were replicated across a series of 4 studies, and are 
consistent with a much larger database of similar psi-indicative research in the forced-choice psi paradigm 
(e.g. Honorton & Ferrari, 1989). 
With respect to design modifications, one key areas in which this study differed from previous studies 
was in the implementation of trial-by-trial feedback. Data from several meta-analyses of forced-choice 
intentional psi studies indicate that the immediacy of feedback in relation to the psi task is a key variable 
in determining the size of effects (Honorton & Ferrari, 1989; Steinkamp, 2005; Steinkamp et al., 1998). 
The use of trial-by-trial feedback also helped to overcome a potential issue that the fundamental need 
being fulfilled in the psi task may be the avoidance of punishment, rather than the seeking of the highest 
reward conditions. With trial-by-trial feedback, it is necessary for participants to score a hit in each and 
every trial in order to avoid being negatively rewarded whereas the feedback system in previous studies 
only required participants to score above chance across the entire run of trials to escape punishment. 
Despite the conceptual advantages of this feedback mechanism, participants, on average, failed to 
outperform the mean chance expectation in the present study, whereas above-MCE results have been 
reported in each of the studies of this type employing end-of-run feedback. It may be, then, that in the 
context of this type of experiment, a series of smaller rewards carry less weight than a single reward of a 
longer duration. 
This study also differed in terms of the task used in the negative reward condition. In the previous 
study, participants who underperformed the mean chance expectation over 15 trials took part in a boring 
number vigilance task. In the present study, however, participants were shown a negative image from the 
IAPS picture set which contained violent, gruesome or scary content. This was intended to enhance the 
emotive impact of the negative outcome, and hence increase participants’ aversion to the negative reward 
condition. This rationale was supported by the finding that a significant, positive relationship was 
observed between participants’ performance on non-intentional trials and their mean scores on Bem’s 
(2003) emotional reactivity items, r(48) = .29, p = .04. 
However, the use of trial-by-trial feedback ensured that it was very unlikely (p < .001) that participants 
could entirely avoid negative rewards, whereas in previous end-of-run scenarios, there was a 50% chance 
of avoiding the negative contingent task. It is therefore possible that the presence of unpleasant stimuli 
throughout the experiment potentially induced a general state of anxiety or a psi equivalent of learned 
helplessness in some participants which may have manifested itself within trials. As a result, rather than 
holding a consistent state of openness, being sensitive to extra-sensory stimuli and responding to them 
accordingly, participants may instead have maintained feelings of apprehension and defensiveness. It is 
also a possibility that certain positive or negative reward images could have primed participants’ 
selections of any subsequent neutral target images. Furthermore, a number of participants indicated a level 
of curiosity towards the negative images, suggesting that some may have been more attracted to the 
negative reward condition than the positive reward condition. In hindsight then, the use of emotive images 
as feedback may be better suited to an end-of-run feedback system in order to avoid building and 
reinforcing a state of anxiety rather than openness and potentially priming subsequent decision making. 
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With respect to the target images themselves, on the basis of participant and reviewer feedback in 
response to the Hitchman et al. (2012) study, sets of four fractal patterns were replaced by pairs of 
authentic images in the present study. This was intended to enhance the ecological validity of the 
precognition task. However, in a similar manner to the Hitchman et al. (2012) study, it was found that 
participants exhibited a systematic bias towards one of the images in two of the target sets. Although in 
the case of both studies target images were selected on the basis of being closely matched in terms of their 
content and valence and arousal ratings, in any set of images which differ tangibly in appearance, there 
remains an opportunity for a range of preferential biases (e.g. colour, gender) to influence participants’ 
selections. Although it could come at the cost of psi discriminability, it is recommended that future studies 
attempt to further increase the normalisation of image sets, such as by using pairs of mirrored images 
(after Bem, 2003). 
On the topic of ecological validity, it is worthwhile to consider a further design element at this stage. In 
the present study, participants took part in a total of 20 equivalent trials. Much of the early PMIR work 
(e.g. Stanford & Thompson, 1973) typically involved a single opportunity for participants to use psi to 
achieve a need-relevant goal, rather than a series of repetitious trials. Although many of the case reports 
from which Stanford developed the PMIR model appeared to involve only one opportunity for the 
exhibitant of psi to achieve a favourable outcome (see Stanford, 1974), repetition per se is not necessarily 
atypical. For example, lots of small delays in a bookshop could just as easily lead to a serendipitous 
meeting as a single delay of a longer duration. Nevertheless, it is recommended that future studies should 
pay very careful attention to the ecological validity of psi tasks to ensure that they reflect the ways in 
which psi is assumed to occur in everyday life situations. 
Turning to the role of intentionality in this paradigm, this study failed to yield evidence of the 
inhibitory influence of need-relevant information in psi-mediated scenarios as proposed by Stanford 
(1990). Participants performed similarly when offered a minimal amount of priming (as in the non-
intentional task) and when given full disclosure regarding the nature of the task (as in the intentional task). 
According to Stanford, all that is necessary for an adaptive psi-mediated outcome to occur is a behaviour, 
and that pondering on such a behaviour could be detrimental. In the present study, participants were 
foretold in their briefing that a psi task would follow what was described as a ‘preparatory’ image 
preference task (the non-intentional psi task). Although it is unlikely that they would have felt the need to 
doubt this instruction, it is possible that some participants may have had conscious cognitions which could 
have altered either the speed of their decisions or the decisions themselves within the non-intentional psi 
task. Whilst greater efforts could be made to further reduce the cognitive priming given to participants in 
relation to the implicit psi task in future studies, we must still face the issue that if we accept the psi 
hypothesis as valid, it would not be possible to entirely avoid cognitive priming, as information in relation 
to tacit tasks could be available by extra-sensory means. 
It is also important to give mention to a design compromise in the present study. Given resource and 
time constraints, a repeated measures design was employed in order to meet sample requirements. Ideally, 
conditions in repeated measures designs should be counterbalanced in order to compensate for the 
potential for range effects such as practice, sensitisation and carry over effects from confounding results 
(Clark-Carter, 2010; Greenwald, 1976; Poulton, 1973). However, given that the non-intentional version of 
the precognition task relied on the naivety of the participants, it was entirely necessary for participants to 
take part in the non-intentional version of the task prior to receiving the briefing for the intentional version 
of the task. As a result, it is possible that some participants may have exhibited a greater level of 
performance at the intentional version of the task owing to them having practised an equivalent task in the 
previous condition. Conversely, some participants may have exhibited a diminished level of performance 
in the intentional trials owing to a decline effect, boredom, desensitisation to the reward stimuli or any 
other performance-based carry over effects associated with having performed a similar task in the 
previous condition. Although, chi square analysis found no evidence of consistent improvements or 
declines in performance across the experiment, authors typically recommended against the use of within 
subjects designs when the juxtaposition of conditions in not the main factor of interest (Greenwald, 1976; 
Poulton, 1973). The potential for these effects to manifest themselves within the data could only be 
 eliminated by randomly allocating participants to take part exclusively in one of the two conditions in a 
between-subjects design. 
The secondary hypotheses in this study concerned the performance of individuals at the non-intentional 
and intentional versions of the precognition task in relation to individual difference measures. Stanford 
(1990) had proposed rigidity in thought and behaviour as one of the principal inhibitory factors in the 
PMIR model. However, no support was found for the hypothesised effect of lability, with participants’ 
scores on the composite measure not being found to correlate significantly with their performance at non-
intentional or intentional precognition trials. Moreover, none of the constituent elements of the lability 
scale were found to covary to a significant extent with precognition scores. Focusing purely on effect sizes 
rather than statistical significance does not provide much more encouragement: all correlations were 
below r = 0.2 in absolute size. Similarly, no relationships were found between precognition task 
performance and participants’ paranormal beliefs. 
However, a significant, positive relationship was observed between participants’ precognitive 
performance and their mean scores on Bem’s (2003) Emotional Reactivity items, but only for non-
intentional trials, r(48) = .29, p = .04. Given the transition to using more emotionally potent images in the 
negative reward condition in this study, it was deemed particularly pertinent to have a gauge of whether 
individuals who were more reactive to negative emotive content would be more aversive to these images, 
and hence avoid the negative reward condition more frequently. As this relationship was only found to be 
significant for the non-intentional condition (the condition more similar in nature to Bem’s [2003] 
precognitive habituation task in which a similar effect has been observed), it was interesting to note that a 
Steiger calculation revealed the difference between the correlations for international and non-intentional 
trials approached a statistically significant level, t(47) = 1.68, p = .05, one-tailed. This may suggest that 
participants’ emotional reactivity does not interact as strongly with their tacit psi performance when they 
are consciously aware of the need to use some form of precognition. 
As was noted by Hitchman et al. (2012), attempting to identify predictors of performance at a psi task 
in an experiment where no overall psi effect has been observed is not straightforward, as it is unclear 
whether psi phenomena were entirely absent from the experimental scenario, or simply if the majority of 
participants failed to demonstrate this ability. Indeed, Palmer (2009) has echoed these concerns by 
bemoaning the unreliability of psi performance and the effect of this on attempts to assess its covariates. 
Unless a relatively consistent psi effect can be identified, attempting to assess the roles of the awareness of 
the need to use psi, the intent to use psi and individual difference correlates of psi will remain problematic 
to achieve. What’s more, a further concern with assessing trait-based measures as predictors of 
experimental variables is that that having a particular trait does not necessarily mean that the trait will be 
expressed under all circumstances. Consequently, future studies may wish to attempt to validate that any 
measure of lability used for a similar purpose is predictive of participants’ propensity to exhibit a relevant 
labile state within the context of the experimental task, as well as ensure that the task is of such a nature 
that participants in that labile state are more likely to achieve a successful outcome. 
To confound this issue, it is important to note that the reliability and validity of psychometric measures 
are typically assessed in isolation (i.e. when not administered amidst multiple other tests). However, 
Council’s (1993) paper on context effects (CEs) highlighted that correlations between psychological tests 
can vary considerably depending on whether they have been administered in the same testing session. The 
distortion of outcomes due to CEs has not been studied extensively, but it is important to keep in mind that 
the use of multiple measures within the same session can have unknown consequences and potentially 
threaten the construct validity of tests. 
Nevertheless, for the second time, a significant difference was found between the psi task performance 
of ‘luck sheep’, those who believed they could use their luck to influence the outcome of the experiment 
and ‘luck goats’, those who didn’t believe they could do so. This finding, then, further strengthens the 
notion that a person’s expectation in their ability to use luck in a particular situation may play a greater 
role in their success as opposed to the specific ways in which they conceive of luck (see Hitchman et al, 
2012). It should be considered worthwhile to include the luck sheep-goat variable in subsequent studies to 
assess whether it is able to withstand the test of time and prove to be a robust and reliable effect. 
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Overall, this study has advanced the non-intentional precognition paradigm in several ways and, in 
turn, has raised a number of additional questions. Firstly, this experiment considered the difference 
between non-intentional and intentional psi tasks, particularly in relation to the cognitive activities of the 
participants engaging in the tasks. No difference was found between performance at either version of the 
precognition task, raising doubt over the PMIR model’s assertion that cognitive priming and focused 
intent can diminish the potential for psi-mediated instrumental responses to be executed. However, given 
that no overall evidence of psi was found within either version of the task, such doubts should only be cast 
cautiously. Concurrently, the first signs of a general pattern of declining results in this paradigm were 
observed. A number of potential explanations for such findings have been considered and should be 
continually monitored as the paradigm continues to be developed. Looking ahead, experimenter effects 
may be one of the most interesting avenues to explore in future studies in an effort to account for 
differential results across contrasting experimental teams. Nevertheless, a meta-analysis considering the 6 
Luke and colleagues and Hitchman and colleagues studies conducted using this paradigm to date suggests 
that the overall paradigm still presents significant evidence of tacit psi, with a Stouffer Z of Z = 3.75, p = 
.00008, mean ES r = .19. 
This study has also contributed to the consideration of the factors which may aid or hinder the 
instigation of psi-mediated instrumental responses, with a particular focus on the role of lability. Overall, 
little evidence was found that lability or any of its constituent elements had a bearing on participants’ 
precognitive performance. Conclusions in relation to the effect of individual difference covariates of psi 
are clearly restricted in a study devoid of any evidence of psi per se. Nevertheless, effects of luck beliefs 
and emotional reactivity were observed, which should be considered as worthwhile variables to consider 
henceforth. Going forward, researchers may wish to turn their attention towards developing more reliable 
performance based measures of the other individual difference covariates which are predicted to influence 
the PMIR process, particularly latent inhibition. In doing so, every effort should be made to tailor trait-
based measures to the context in which they are expected to be expressed and to minimise the potential for 
measurements to impact upon the assessment of other experimental variables. 
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